Benin on the Brink: Failed Coup, Nigeria’s Power Play and the New Battle for West African Military Dominance
Benin had long been viewed as one of West Africa’s relatively stable democracies. Until now, despite regional turmoil around it — especially the spread of jihadist insurgencies from the Sahel — Benin had avoided the full-scale military takeovers that have afflicted some of its neighbors. The recent attempted coup marks a sharp breach in that record. 
In the past few years, northern Benin has faced growing security threats. The jihadist insurgency operating in the Sahel has expanded southwards, encroaching on Benin’s border regions. In response, the government under Patrice Talon strengthened its military — expanding the National Guard, improving training and structure of the armed forces, and deploying troops to troubled areas.
Economically, Benin has worked to attract foreign investment, develop its agriculture and trade potential, and industrialise. The country’s stability has been a selling point for investors.  Against this backdrop, any political upheaval or coup attempt threatens to shake investor confidence, disrupt trade flows, and reverse gains the country has made.
As of early December 2025, with presidential elections scheduled for April 2026 and the announced departure of Talon at the end of his mandate, the political transition was supposed to proceed via constitutional, democratic means. 
The Coup Attempt: What Happened
In the early hours of December 7, 2025, a group of soldiers from the Benin armed forces appeared on national television. They declared that they had seized power, suspended the constitution and state institutions, and dissolved the government. They named themselves the Military Committee for Re-foundation (CMR) and appointed Pascal Tigri, a lieutenant colonel, as head of the new authority.
The group cited grievances including perceived neglect of fallen soldiers and their families, dissatisfaction with Talon’s governance and alleged favoritism, worsening security (especially in the north), economic mismanagement, and socio-political discontent. 
Gunfire was reported near the presidential residence in the capital, and key institutions — including the national television station — were briefly seized. 
For a few hours, the mutineers held parts of the capital; they attempted to symbolically and legally dismantle the government. But loyalist forces resisted, moved in, and by late morning/early afternoon the same day, the government declared the coup attempt foiled. 
At least fourteen people were arrested, many of them active-duty soldiers. Some plotters remained at large, including Tigri. It appears the mutiny was limited — not a mass military uprising, but a small faction. 
Nigeria’s Intervention: Strategic, Political, and Security Considerations
What happened next is critical to understanding the regional dynamics: Nigerian Armed Forces — at the behest of Benin’s government — intervened with fighter jets and ground troops, launching precision airstrikes on a military camp held by the coup plotters (the Togbin camp) and freeing captured officers. 
This marks Nigeria’s first foreign military intervention since 2017, when it responded to the constitutional crisis in The Gambia.  The intervention was enabled via the regional bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which deployed standby troops also from Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Ivory Coast — a show of regional solidarity in defence of constitutional order. 
From a strategic standpoint, Nigeria’s rapid response suggests a mix of motivations. Politically, it reaffirms Nigeria’s position as a regional power and guarantor of stability in West Africa. Regional stability matters to Nigeria, given its economic interdependence with neighbors and the risk of instability spilling over — especially given the jihadist threat already reaching northern Benin. 
Security-wise, the intervention likely aimed to prevent a power vacuum in Benin which might have been exploited by jihadist groups or criminal networks active in the Sahel corridors. Benin, being geographically close to Nigeria and part of regional trade and migration routes, has strategic importance for Nigeria’s national security calculations.
Economically, preserving Benin’s stability also protects cross-border trade and commerce. A hostile military regime in Cotonou could disrupt trade corridors, affect currency stability (note that international bonds issued by Benin suffered price drops after the coup attempt) and scare off foreign investment. 
Moreover, Nigeria (and ECOWAS) by intervening prevented what could have been a precedent-setting coup in a low-profile but strategically placed coastal state. The success likely serves as deterrence to future coup plotters in similar states.
Nonetheless, the intervention also raises fresh questions about sovereignty, regional intervention norms, and how external military involvement may affect domestic political dynamics.
Military Role and Scope within Benin — Before and After the Coup
Under Talon’s government, the military in Benin had already been strengthened in response to rising jihadist threats. The armed forces and security apparatus were reformed: the National Guard expanded, special forces and commando/parachute battalions established, equipment improved, and recruitment/training scaled up. By early 2025, official figures suggested roughly 8,200 active frontline soldiers and 1,500 in training. 
The logic was partly preventive: to respond to border-region insurgencies, to co-operate with neighboring states, and to avoid external destabilisation. The expansion of military capacity was also likely intended to bolster the state’s monopoly on violence at a time when the insurgency had grown more potent and more daring. 
However, the very fact that a relatively small group within those forces attempted a coup reveals underlying vulnerabilities. It suggests fractures within the military: grievances over neglect, poor treatment of fallen soldiers’ families, perceived favoritism, economic frustrations or marginalization inside the army, and discontent with political leadership. 
In effect, the coup attempt exposed a dual reality. On one hand, the military had become stronger, better structured, more capacitated against insurgency. On the other, internal cohesion and loyalty cannot be taken for granted; institutional reforms and modernization do not automatically translate into disciplined unity or political reliability.
After the coup attempt, with its failure and the intervention, the military’s political role may likely be recalibrated. The civilian leadership — having relied on foreign intervention — may become more wary of allowing any segment of the armed forces unilateral power. There may be purges, reorganisation, loyalty vetting. The government may accelerate reforms: better pay and care for soldiers and families, clearer chain of command, stricter oversight — to prevent recurrence. Indeed, Talon has promised strict action against those responsible. 
But long-term this incident also raises questions about the appropriate scope of military influence in Benin’s political life. Will the military be strictly limited to national defence and internal security (especially counter-insurgency)? Or might it seek a more overt political role, especially if future crises arise? The 2025 attempt shows that even in a “democratic” and “stable” country, the military — or at least parts of it — can still be a decisive political actor.
In addition, the fact that external forces (Nigerian/ECOWAS) intervened to prop up the civilian government may shift perceptions internally — potentially breeding resentment among nationalists or among soldiers unhappy with reliance on foreign intervention. That could affect morale, cohesion, and long-term trust in civilian oversight.
Regional Implications: Security, Sovereignty and the Risk of Fragmentation
The failed coup in Benin, and the foreign military intervention, represent a crossing of lines in West African politics and security norms. Historically, many African states jealously guard sovereignty and reject external intervention — even when coups occur internally. That the government of Benin requested help, and Nigeria obliged, shows a shift: in high-stakes crises, sovereignty is being re-interpreted in functional, rather than absolutist, terms.
For Nigeria, this intervention is a projection of power — a strategic reassertion of leadership in West Africa. It signals that Nigeria intends to remain a key security actor, willing to use force beyond its borders to protect regional stability. This may reassure some neighbours, but also unsettle others, especially in light of evolving alliances.
Indeed, the episode complicates relations with another regional grouping: the recently formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The AES, formed after those countries broke away from ECOWAS in 2025, has asserted a new regional alignment — more military-led, more sovereigntist, more suspicious of foreign intervention. 
That makes the context especially delicate: just days after Nigeria’s intervention in Benin, authorities in Burkina Faso detained eleven Nigerian military personnel — crew and passengers aboard a Nigerian Air Force C-130 — after it landed in Bobo-Dioulasso. The aircraft reportedly entered AES-controlled airspace without clearance and was forced to land, with all on board detained. 
This incident underscores how sensitive the AES countries are to perceived violations of their sovereignty, especially by foreign militaries. The detention reflects growing assertiveness by AES regimes, and signals that Nigeria’s bold intervention may provoke regional pushback elsewhere.
Moreover, it shows how the West African theatre is now a patchwork of overlapping — and sometimes conflicting — regional security architectures: ECOWAS vs. AES, pro-democracy constitutionalists vs. military-led regimes, and varying alignments that may depend on short-term interests rather than stable blocs.
The risk is that such friction could lead to fragmentation, clashes of authority, miscalculation — especially in a region already threatened by insurgency, trafficking, porous borders, and weak governance.
Economic and Political Risks for Benin — In Light of the Coup Attempt
From an economic perspective, the immediate fallout has already been visible. International bond markets reacted negatively: bonds issued by Benin, particularly long-term euro- and dollar-denominated ones, dropped in value after the coup attempt. 
Investor confidence is likely shaken: a country that was seen as stable, democratic, and reform-oriented now has shown vulnerability. Foreign direct investment, trade-related flows, development projects, all could suffer delays or cancellations — particularly if political uncertainty lingers until the scheduled 2026 elections.
Politically, the coup attempt exposes serious structural weaknesses in civil-military relations in Benin. It reveals discontent within the security forces. Unless addressed, this could lead to recurring instability. The government must now navigate carefully: deliver reforms, address grievances (especially among rank-and-file soldiers), and rebuild trust — all while preparing for upcoming elections.
In addition, reliance on Nigeria (and ECOWAS) to restore order may come with long-term strings attached. The precedent of external intervention could shape future political bargaining, influence foreign policy orientation, and create leverage for external powers.
Finally, the incident may deepen polarization inside Benin. Those critical of Talon’s legacy — or of perceived elite mismanagement — may see the coup attempt as a symptom, not an aberration. Whether the government deals with root causes (economic inequality, neglect of certain regions, military grievances) or simply suppresses dissent by force will matter for future legitimacy.
Conclusions: What the Coup Attempt and Intervention Reveal — And What Comes Next
The December 2025 coup attempt in Benin — though short-lived — represents a seismic rupture in what had been regarded as one of West Africa’s stable democracies. It laid bare underlying grievances within the military, structural weaknesses in civil-military relations, and the pressure exerted by growing insecurity in the region.
That the government requested, and that Nigeria provided, military intervention underlines how regional security interdependence is increasingly shaping national sovereignty in West Africa. Nigeria’s swift action reaffirms its role as regional security guarantor, but also signals a shift in regional norms: in crises, external military force may become more acceptable. That carries both stabilizing and destabilizing potential.
For Benin, the immediate suppression of the coup, the restoration of order, and the promise to continue with elections by 2026 offer a path to reset and recovery. Yet the economic shock — bond price slumps, shaken investor confidence — plus the depth of military grievances, raise serious questions about medium-term stability.
In the broader region, this event may accelerate the realignment of states: those favoring constitutional order and regional cooperation (e.g., under ECOWAS) versus those adhering to military regimes and new groupings like the AES. That contest is likely to define West Africa’s security and political landscape for the next several years — with huge implications for governance, development, and regional integration.
By Jide Adesina
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